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Abstract 
Marriage is a crucial social phenomenon associated with almost every human’s life. However, it 
has been a well-known social phenomenon that people are delaying their first marriage. In this 
paper, I will apply matching theory to discuss some possible reasons for this change of marriage 
timing, namely change of discounting. I will also introduce asymmetry to the model. This will 
potentially answer questions about marriage matching in countries with high sex ratio. The result 
shows that decrease penalty for delaying marriage and the increase in sex ratio can both 
contribute to the delay of marriage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Marriage is a crucial social phenomenon associated with almost every human’s life. It has been 
an important function in human society for thousands of years. Recently, however, delaying 
marriage has become a common social phenomenon. There was a report made by D’Vera Cohn 
(2011), “…the age at which men and women marry for the first time continues to rise to record 
levels.”  In this paper, I will focus on the relationship between marriage matching timing and 
value of discounting. Then I will discuss how the sex ratio would change the matching. 
In the real world, we constantly make decisions. From another perspective, we, the 
people, are matching with the possible cases. Marriage is one type of these decision makings or 
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matchings. The discounting factor would be associated with the cost of delaying the marriage 
decision, and we would expect that when people lose more while waiting, they would match 
more quickly. The phenomenon of the delay of marriage could be the result of less penalty of 
waiting in nowadays’ society. 
There are two approaches I would use in this paper in order to find out the effect of 
discounting factor on marriage timing. The first approach is to develop a theoretical model that 
could predict the marriage timing. The second one is to conduct a Matlab simulation to check the 
result of theory. After discussing the effect of discounting factor, I will introduce an information 
error term in the model and then discuss the effect using simulation.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a literature review about the 
relating matching models. Section 3 provides a basic model of marriage matching, the simulation 
result, and the discussion of discounting factor’s effect. Section 4 extends the symmetric model 
to a model with asymmetric distribution of the two matching groups. Section 5 states conclusion 
and possible real-world implication of the model. 
 
2. Literature review 
Early literature such as Becker’s “A Theory of Marriage Part I” (1973) consider that matching 
would happen, somehow magically, when the two side of the market has properties sufficient to 
each other. In his paper, he assumes each man and woman have a universally accepted rank, and 
everyone tries to find the best to match. The result he found is best assortative matching (PAM), 
which the best man matches to the best woman; the next best man matches to the next best 
woman; and so on. However, he only provides a stable and optimal strategy of matching without 
a structure predicting marriage timing in his model. 
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 An extension of the Becker’s PAM is Burdett and Coles’ 1997 paper “Marriage and 
Class”. In their paper, they use the idea of “pizzazz” instead of ranking, which is a non-
transferable utility flow. When a man and a woman marry, the flow utility to a man is simply the 
woman’s pizzazz, and the flow to a woman is the man’s pizzazz. In their paper, they concluded 
that there are classes of pizzazz, such that one would only marry a person in the same class. It is 
less restrictive than that only the top man can marry the top woman in PAM because it takes time 
to meet someone. Although their framework could provide some insight of marriage timing, their 
literature, instead, focuses on the result of matching and optimal strategy. I will borrow the idea 
of non-transferable utility flow and some structure of Burdett and Cole’s paper but discuss the 
marriage timing. 
In South’s longitudinal study, Variable Effects of Family Background on the Timing of 
First Marriage (2001), he mentions that people from a higher level of socio-economic 
background tend to delay their marriage. It could be possible that this delay is a result of a lower 
delay cost: people from a wealthier household could enjoy life even not married. However, it 
does not explain in theory how this timing is affected. 
In the later discussions on the marriage market, there are many researchers focus on the 
searching and matching. Their idea is that people need to search the market in order to find a 
match, and there is generally a cost associated with the searching process. For example, Axell 
(1977) discusses in his paper how the information cost would affect the wage dispersion. 
However, I would look at the matching in a different way. In this paper, I would regard meeting 
as a natural process and there is no active searching. We meet people on normal base, and what 
makes the difference is whether or not we choose to form a match. 
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3. Simple Model and Discussion  
3.1 Simple Model (symmetric group)  
 The simple model provides a matching process with a discounting factor. Time is discrete 
and goes on forever: t = 1, 2, 3… 
 In each period, there is a unit mass of unmatched agents of type A and of type B. The A’s 
are indexed by i; the B’s are indexed by j. 
In this simple model, the only randomness is whom the agent meets. In each period, 
unmatched agents meet partners at random. Each agent i and j has a “pizzazz”, which has 
distributions 𝐻(𝑖) and 𝐺(𝑗)̅. They decide whether or not to match, based on their observation of 
each other’s pizzazz level. Here, I assume that they have perfect information, including 
population distribution and each other’s pizzazz level. Once matched, agents never split, and the 
market is replenished, so the distribution of prospective partners remains the same. 
The pizzazz of i, 𝑢(𝑖), indicates how much utility flow a j would receive if i matches with 
j, vice versa. This pizzazz can only be received one time in the period they match together. (It 
can also be seen as the continuation value of all future utility flows.) I assume that there would 
be no utility flow received while one stays unmatched. (If there is, we can adjust the pizzazz to 
accommodate it.) 
b is the discounting factor in each period. In the first part of this paper, I will discuss 
exclusively the effect of discounting on the matching equilibrium and timing. 
There could be several possible solutions to this model, we can think each agent classify 
the other person into two classes: Accept Class, and Reject Class. There could be two types of 
solutions for each agent: “separating equilibrium”, where agent i chooses a level of pizzazz that 
if the other agent j is above this level, i classifies j as Accept Class; “pooling equilibrium”, where 
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agent i classifies each observed pizzazz level j as “Accept Class” with a probability. Note that 
“separating equilibrium” is a special case of the pooling equilibrium that there is a probability of 
0 or 1 for each pizzazz level. The “pooling equilibrium” is out of the scope of this paper, and I 
will primarily focus on the “separating equilibrium”.1 
In the “separating equilibrium”, each agent would choose a reservation pizzazz, which is 
the lowest pizzazz level one would agree to match. For an unmatched agent j, the reservation 
pizzazz is indicated as 𝑢?̅?. Agent j would agree to match with i, when 𝑢(𝑖) ≥ 𝑢?̅?, and similarly for 
agent i. They would only match when they both agree to match, i.e. 𝑢(𝑖) ≥ 𝑢?̅? and 𝑢(𝑗) ≥ 𝑢?̅?. 
In the next matching period, if the agent is matched, he will receive the pizzazz of the 
mate. Otherwise, she would expect to receive value, (w.p. - with probability) 
𝑏 ∗ {
𝐸[𝑢(𝑗)|𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔]       𝑤. 𝑝.   𝑄(𝑗)
𝑐(𝑢?̅?)         𝑤. 𝑝.   1 − 𝑄(𝑗)
 
The expected continuation value is 𝑐(𝑢?̅?) 
𝑐(𝑢?̅?) = 𝑏 ∗ (𝐸(𝑗) + (1 − 𝑄(𝑗)) ∗ 𝑐(𝑢?̅?)) 
                       𝑐(𝑢?̅?) =  
𝑏 ∗ 𝐸(𝑗)
1 − 𝑏 ∗ (1 − 𝑄(𝑗))
                     
where 𝐸(𝑗) indicates the expected utility flow of matching, 𝐸(𝑗) = 𝐸[𝑢(𝑗)|𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔] ∗ 𝑄(𝑗), 
and 𝑄(𝑗) is the probability of matching. 
At this point, suppose u is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. Now, I start the 
analysis for the top person. For a top person with pizzazz = 1, everyone would like to match with 
her, and the best match would be another agent with pizzazz 1, the worst match would be the 
reservation pizzazz 𝑢1̅̅ ̅. Therefore, her expected matching pizzazz for next period would be 
1+ 𝑢1̅̅̅̅
2
 
                                                          
1 The “separating equilibrium” and “pooling equilibrium” does not refer to the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in the 
Signaling Game. I just borrowed the names. 
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for the uniform distribution. The probability of a matching for her would be (1 − 𝑢1̅̅ ̅). 𝐸(𝑗) =
𝐸[𝑢𝑖(𝑗)|𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔] ∗ 𝑄(𝑗) =
1+ 𝑢1̅̅̅̅
2
∗ (1 − 𝑢1̅̅ ̅). 
Therefore, the expected value would be 
𝑐(𝑢1̅̅ ̅) = 𝑏 ∗ (
1 + 𝑢1̅̅ ̅
2
) ∗ (1 − 𝑢1̅̅ ̅) + 𝑢1̅̅ ̅ ∗ 𝑐(𝑢1̅̅ ̅)) 
Solve 𝑐(𝑢1̅̅ ̅) 
(
1
𝑏
− 𝑢1̅̅ ̅) ∗ 𝑐(𝑢1̅̅ ̅) =
1 − 𝑢1̅̅ ̅
2
2
 
𝑐(𝑢1̅̅ ̅) =
1 −  𝑢1̅̅ ̅
2
2 ∗ (
1
𝑏 − 𝑢1̅̅ ̅)
 
If the agent is rational, she would choose the optimal reservation value 𝑢1̅̅ ̅
∗, such that she 
would be indifferent between selecting a partner with 𝑢1̅̅ ̅
∗, or continuing searching. Therefore, 
𝑢1̅̅ ̅
∗ = 𝑐 (𝑢1̅̅ ̅
∗) 
𝑢1̅̅ ̅
∗ =
1 −  𝑢1̅̅ ̅
∗2
2 ∗ (
1
𝑏 − 𝑢1̅̅ ̅
∗)
 
𝑢1̅̅ ̅
∗ ∗ 2 ∗ (
1
𝑏
− 𝑢1̅̅ ̅
∗) = 1 −  𝑢1̅̅ ̅
∗2 
𝑢1̅̅ ̅
∗2 −
2
𝑏
∗ 𝑢1̅̅ ̅
∗ + 1 = 0 
This is solvable for all b from 0 to 1. The roots of this equation are: 
2
𝑏 ±
√ 4
𝑏2
− 4
2
=
1
𝑏
± √
1
𝑏2
− 1 =
1
𝑏
(1 ± √1 − 𝑏2) 
Only the smaller root is relevant, since the bigger one exceeds 1. The optimal reservation pizzazz 
is: 
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𝑢1̅̅ ̅
∗ =
1
𝑏
(1 − √1 − 𝑏2) 
Example 1: if 𝑏 = 0.8, 𝑢1̅̅ ̅
∗ =
1
0.8
(1 − √1 − 0.82)=0.5 
 With a reservation value of 0.5, the expected continuation value for agent with pizzazz 1 would be  
0.8 ∗ {
1
2
∗ (1 + 0.5)       𝑤. 𝑝.   0.5
𝑐(0.5)         𝑤. 𝑝.   0.5
 
The expected value therefore is 
𝑐(0.5) = 0.8 ∗ (
1
2
∗ (1 + 0.5) ∗ 0.5 + 𝑐(0.5) ∗ 0.5) 
 𝑐(0.5) = 0.5 
  
Example 2: As 𝑏 → 1, 𝑢1̅̅ ̅
∗ =
1
1
(1 − √1 − 12) = 1. The top person would match with others of almost 
identical quality. This is because there is no discounting, a person would continue waiting until finding 
the best match. 
Example 3: if 𝑏 = 0. 𝑢1̅̅ ̅
∗ = 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑏→0
1
𝑏
− √
1
𝑏2
− 1 = 0. The top person would like to match with anyone, since 
there is perfect discounting, and only first period matters. 
Returning to the entire matching case, for a top person, she would match with anyone 
with pizzazz above reservation value 𝑢1̅̅ ̅
∗. Since the case is symmetric, anyone within the [𝑢1̅̅ ̅
∗, 1] 
range can match with a top person. With the same analysis, we can obtain that anyone with 
pizzazz     ∈ [𝑢1̅̅ ̅
∗, 1]would have the same level of reservation pizzazz. Let’s define that people 
with pizzazz in [𝑢1̅̅ ̅
∗, 1] in class 1. 
 Now let’s define “top threshold” as 𝑇𝑇 =
1
𝑏
− √
1
𝑏2
− 1. The first class is [𝑇𝑇, 1] 
 There are two results: 
1. If two agents from class 1 meet, they will match. 
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2. An agent in class 1 will not match with any person out of class 1. 
If person j out of class 1 tries to match, he must select from people also out of class 1; in 
other words, from the interval 0 ≤ 𝑢(𝑖) < 𝑇𝑇. This interval defines the second tier in the market. 
I can normalize the upper bound of the second tier to 1 by dividing each pizzazz in the 
second tier by 𝑇𝑇. The problem repeats. There will be another ‘class 1’ from the second tier, in 
which they will only match with people within the class. 
Let’s define the new top class as class 2, and it would be [𝑇𝑇, 1) in the normalized 
second tier. Class 2 would be [𝑇𝑇2, 𝑇𝑇) in the original pizzazz distribution before normalizing. 
 By induction, Class n would be [𝑇𝑇𝑛, 𝑇𝑇𝑛−1), and agents would only match with agents 
within the same class. This analytical result is consistent with Burdett and Coles’ 1997 paper 
“Marriage and Class,” that class structure exists in the matching equilibrium. It is quite certain 
that the class effect is a result of the discounting: when there is no discounting, it will be positive 
assortative matching, every pizzazz level is one class (example 3); when there is perfect 
discounting, everyone will be in the same class, i.e. no class (example 2). 
 For agents in Class n, 
Q(j) = 𝑇𝑇𝑛−1 − 𝑇𝑇𝑛 = (
1
𝑇𝑇
− 1) ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑛 
E[𝑢(j)|matching] =
𝑇𝑇𝑛 + 𝑇𝑇𝑛−1
2
=
1
𝑇𝑇 + 1
2
∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑛−1 
E(j) =  E[𝑢(j)|matching] ∗  Q(j) =
1
𝑇𝑇2
− 1
2
∗ 𝑇𝑇2𝑛−1 
where Q(j) is probability of matching, E[𝑢(j)|matching] is the expected utility flow given 
matching, and E(j) is the expected utility flow of matching. 
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 Finally, the expected timing of matching would be the inverse of the probability of 
matching. For agents in Class n, [𝑇𝑇𝑛, 𝑇𝑇𝑛−1), the size would be 𝑇𝑇𝑛 − 𝑇𝑇𝑛−1 = 𝑇𝑇𝑛−1 . The 
probability of matching would be, therefore, 𝑇𝑇𝑛−1. The expected time T until a match for 
agents in Class n would be 𝐸[𝑇] =
1
𝑇𝑇𝑛−1
. 
 
Example 1: if 𝑏 = 0.8, the threshold is 𝑇𝑇 = 0.5. 
For agents in Class 1, the range is [0.5,1] and the expected matching period is 2. For agents in Class n, 
the range is [0.5𝑛, 0.5𝑛−1) and the expected matching period is 2𝑛. 𝑄(𝑗) = 0.5𝑛, 𝐸[𝑢𝑖(𝑗)|𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔] =
3 ∗ 0.5𝑛+1, 𝐸(𝑗) =  3 ∗ 0.52𝑛+1. 
  
Example 2: As 𝑏 → 1, 𝑇𝑇 → 1. The model approaches positive assortative matching (PAM) and time 
approaches infinity. This is because there is no discounting, a person would continue waiting until finding 
the best match. 𝑄(𝑗) = 0, 𝐸[𝑢𝑖(𝑗)|𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔] = 0, 𝐸(𝑗) =  0. 
 
Example 3: if 𝑏 = 0, 𝑇𝑇 = 0. There would be only one class [0,1]. Agents would like to match with 
anyone they meet, since there is perfect discounting, and only first period matters. It is a random 
matching. Everyone match in the first period. 𝑄(𝑗) = 1, 𝐸[𝑢(𝑗)|𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔] = 0.5, 𝐸(𝑗) =  0.5. 
 
3.2 Numerical Solution of the Simple Model 
Now, I simulate two groups of agents and each group contains one of each pizzazz level 
1,2,…,100. To calculate the reservation pizzazz and probabilities, I employ the fixed point 
iteration method:  
1. I first give an arbitrary set of reservation pizzazz. 
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2. Then, I simulate 1000 random matching cases for the whole population. In each 
simulation, each j from group B is randomly assigned to an i from group A. 
3. i’s and j’s would decide match or not by comparing observed pizzazz and reservation 
pizzazz. 
4. I use these simulated data2 to calculate the probability of matching for a given j at 
each period, 𝑄(𝑗), and the expected utility flow of matching for j, 𝐸(𝑗). 
5. I calculate the continuation values for each j, 𝑐(𝑢?̅?), and set it as the new reservation 
pizzazz, return to the step 2. 
I would stop the iteration if the change of reservation pizzazz is smaller than the tolerance or the 
iteration exceed 1000 round. 
After obtaining the result of reservation pizzazz, I again form a game of two identical 
groups matching but without replacing. Each simulation, I have two groups of 1 to 100 integers, 
each value has 10 people. I have them meet randomly and matched based on the criterion. Then I 
record the ones matched, the round of their matching. The remaining agents would start the 
second round. The process keeps going until 100 rounds or everyone gets matched. I take 100 
simulations and take the average as the final result.  
I first set the discounting factor, b, as 0.8. Based on the result of example 3, For agents in 
Class n, the range is [0.5n, 0.5n−1) and the expected matching period is 2n. Q(j) = 0.5n, 
E[𝑢(j)|matching] = 3 ∗ 0.5n+1, E(j) =  3 ∗ 0.52n+1.  The simulation result should be the 
expected value times 100. Here are the result figures of the simulation: 
 
                                                          
2 Here, I used all 1000 independent simulations to make the probability of matching and expected utility flow more 
accurate. 
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We can see that the simulation result is consistent with the analytical result. We can 
clearly see the class effect from the figures above. However, since the values are discrete in 
simulation, the results would not perfectly match. Also, because of the perfect matching. 
The first class result matches almost exactly with the analytical solution: for agent i in 
Class 1, the range is [0.5,1) and the expected matching period is 2, Q(j) = 0.5, 
E[𝑢(j)|matching] = 0.75, and E(j) =  0.375. 
Based on the analytical solution, “Class 2” should start at 25, and “Class 3” should start 
at 12.5. However, the simulation shows that Class 2 starts around 19 and Class 3 starts around 4. 
This discrepancy happens because the simulation consists only 100 discrete numbers instead of 
uniform distribution from 0 to 1. As a result, the class structures would not exactly match the 
analytical solution. Only when we add more integers in simulation, for example, 0 to 1000, we 
will see the lower classes match the analytical solution better. 
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3.3 Effect of Discounting Factor  
Here, we can discuss the effect of changing of information error. 𝑇𝑇 =
1
𝑏
− √
1
𝑏2
− 1. If there are 
less discounting (b increases), top threshold TT would increase. We can see more narrowed 
classes; it will take a longer period to match; the matching probability would be lowered for 
everyone. 
 We can also see clearly from the numerical results as well that as b increases, everyone 
would take longer to match. It could be the case that as the technology advances, we have more 
options in life. There are more things that we can do to gain utility, so there would be less 
discounting. The delay of marriage could be a result of the reduction of discounting for each 
period. 
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4. Model with Asymmetric Groups 
4.1 Matching Model with Information Error  
In the real life, we usually do not have symmetric matching groups (1:1 sex ration). Some 
countries, like China, have a heavily skewed sex ratio. In this section, I would like to discuss the 
model’s equilibrium with asymmetric groups. Now, let us assume that the distribution of pizzazz 
of group A is still uniform between 0 and 1, 𝑢𝐴(i) ∈ [0,1], and the distribution of pizzazz of 
group B is still uniform between 0 and 𝑎, 𝑢𝐵(j) ∈ [0, 𝑎]. 𝑎 indicates the sex ratio between group 
A and B. Without loss of generality, we can assume 𝑎 > 1. 𝑎 = 1 is the symmetric case. A and 
B would have the same number of agents for each value, 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑢𝐴(i)) = 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑢𝐵(j)). 
In this model, two sides would have different reservation pizzazz. Each agent j in group 
B would choose a reservation pizzazz level, 𝑢𝐵𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ . i in group B would choose a reservation pizzazz 
level, 𝑢𝐴𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ .  They would certainly agree to match with anyone with observed pizzazz level bigger 
than the reservation pizzazz and refuse to match with anyone with observed pizzazz level less 
than it. 
With the information error, the matching process for j from group B3 is as follows: 
1. Set a "reservation pizzazz", 𝑢𝐵𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ .  
2. Meet an i,or not meet anyone. (An i in group A would always meet someone). 
3. If meet an i, observe one value from i: 𝑢𝐴(i). 
3. If 𝑢𝐴(i) ≥ 𝑢𝐵𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ , agree to match with i. 
4. If i and j both agree, i and j match, and i receives 𝑢𝐵(j)), j receives 𝑢𝐴(i) 
5. If not match, both receive 0 and return to step 1 in next period with discounting. 
                                                          
3 Note that since j has a larger population, some j may not match with an i in an period, but each i would definitely 
meet a j. 
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In each period, a j from group B would have a probability of 
𝑎−1
𝑎
 of meeting no one in 
each period. When two agents meet, if 𝑢𝐴(i) ≥ 𝑢𝐵𝑗̅̅ ̅̅  and 𝑢𝐵(𝑗) ≥ 𝑢𝐴𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ , they would match. 
 Similar to the symmetric case, the expected continuation value for a j in group B is 
𝑐𝐵(𝑢𝐵𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ) 
𝑐𝐵(𝑢𝐵𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ) = 𝑏 ∗ (𝐸𝐵(𝑗) + (1 − 𝑄𝐵(𝑗)) ∗ 𝑐𝐵(𝑢𝐵𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ) 
For a top agent in group B with pizzazz level a, 
𝑐𝐵(𝑢𝐵𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) =
𝑏 ∗ 𝐸𝐵(𝑎)
1 − 𝑏 ∗ (1 − 𝑄𝐵(𝑎))
 
For a top agent in group A with pizzazz level 1, 
𝑐𝐴(𝑢𝐴1̅̅ ̅̅̅) =
𝑏 ∗ 𝐸𝐴(1)
1 − 𝑏 ∗ (1 − 𝑄𝐴(1))
 
 
At the steady state, value of matching with an agent with reservation and value of not match 
should equals to each other. Therefore,  
𝑢𝐵𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =
𝑏 ∗ 𝐸𝐵(𝑎)
1 − 𝑏 ∗ (1 − 𝑄𝐵(𝑎))
 
𝑢𝐴1̅̅ ̅̅̅ =
𝑏 ∗ 𝐸𝐴(1)
1 − 𝑏 ∗ (1 − 𝑄𝐴(1))
 
 
For agent j in group B with pizzazz level 𝑢𝐵𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅,  the expected value would be 
𝑐(𝑢𝐵𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) = 𝑏 ∗ (
1 − 𝑢𝐵𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑎
∗
𝑢𝐵𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 1
2
+ (1 −
1 − 𝑢𝐵𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑎
) ∗ 𝑐(𝑢𝐵𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)) 
𝑐(𝑢𝐵𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) =
𝑏 ∗
1 − 𝑢𝐵𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑎 ∗
𝑢𝐵𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 1
2
1 − 𝑏 ∗ (1 −
1 − 𝑢𝐵𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑎 )
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At optimal level, 𝑐(𝑢𝐵𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) = 𝑢𝐵𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅. 
(1 − 𝑏 ∗ (1 −
1 − 𝑢𝐵𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑎
)) ∗ 𝑢𝐵𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 𝑏 ∗
1 − 𝑢𝐵𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑎
∗
𝑢𝐵𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 1
2
 
2 ∗ (𝑎 − 𝑎𝑏 + 𝑏 − 𝑏 ∗ 𝑢𝐵𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) ∗ 𝑢𝐵𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 𝑏 ∗ (1 − 𝑢𝐵𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
2) 
𝑏 ∗ 𝑢𝐵𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
2 − 2(𝑎 − 𝑎𝑏 + 𝑏) ∗ 𝑢𝐵𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝑏 = 0 
 
𝑢𝐵𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =
2(𝑎 − 𝑎𝑏 + 𝑏) ± √4(𝑎 − 𝑎𝑏 + 𝑏)2 − 4 ∗ 𝑏 ∗ 𝑏
2𝑏
=
2(𝑎 − 𝑎𝑏 + 𝑏) ± 2√(𝑎 − 𝑎𝑏) ∗ (𝑎 − 𝑎𝑏 + 2𝑏)
2𝑏
=
𝑎 − 𝑎𝑏 + 𝑏 ± √𝑎(1 − 𝑏) ∗ (𝑎 − 𝑎𝑏 + 2𝑏)
𝑏
 
𝑢𝐵𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ≤ 1, therefore, 
𝑎−𝑎𝑏+𝑏
𝑏
> 1 implies that 𝑢𝐵𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =
𝑎−𝑎𝑏+𝑏−√𝑎(1−𝑏)∗(𝑎−𝑎𝑏+2𝑏)
𝑏
. 
 
Let’s define the top threshold for group B as 𝑇𝑇𝐵 = 𝑢𝐵𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =
𝑎−𝑎𝑏+𝑏−√𝑎(1−𝑏)∗(𝑎−𝑎𝑏+2𝑏)
𝑏
. 
The root is always obtainable since 1 − 𝑏 > 0 and 𝑎 − 𝑎𝑏 + 2𝑏 > 0. This value defines “Class 
1” in group A. 
Similarly, we can calculate the 𝑢𝐴1̅̅ ̅̅̅ = 𝑎 ∗
1−√1−𝑏2
𝑏
. Now define the top threshold for 
group A as 𝑇𝑇𝐴 = 𝑢𝐴1̅̅ ̅̅̅ = 𝑎 ∗
1−√1−𝑏2
𝑏
. We know that anyone above TTB in group A (Class 1 of 
group A) can match with the top agent in group B, therefore, their optimal threshold level 
problem would be same as the top agent in group A’s optimal threshold level. Therefore, 
[𝑇𝑇𝐵, 1] forms Class 1 in group A and [𝑇𝑇𝐴, 𝑎] forms Class 1 in group B. The remaining agents 
in group A would have size TTB, and the remaining agents in group B would have size TTA.  
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We can see that the second tier’s sex ratio TTA:TTB would generally not be the same as 
the population ratio, 𝑎: 1. 
𝑠𝑒𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  𝑇𝑇𝐴: 𝑇𝑇𝐵 =
𝑎 ∗
1 − √1 − 𝑏2
𝑏
𝑎 − 𝑎𝑏 + 𝑏 − √𝑎(1 − 𝑏) ∗ (𝑎 − 𝑎𝑏 + 2𝑏)
𝑏
=
𝑎 ∗ (1 − √1 − 𝑏2)
𝑎 − 𝑎𝑏 + 𝑏 − √𝑎(1 − 𝑏) ∗ (𝑎 − 𝑎𝑏 + 2𝑏)
The class structure seems to sustain in the model with asymmetric groups. However, an 
easy expression of the analytical solution is hard to obtain. Instead, I would use the mathematical 
simulation to calculate the reservation pizzazz for each individual type. 
4.2 Simulation with Asymmetric Groups 
Now, I would include the asymmetric matching groups in the simulation, with sex ratio a. 
I still have group A has pizzazz level 1,2,3,…,100, and group B has 1,2,3,…, floor(100a). 4 I also 
assign (floor(100a)-100) zeros to group A to represent the case that a j from group B meets no 
agent in a period. The simulation process mimics the matching process: 
1. I first give an arbitrary set of reservation pizzazz for each group.
2. Then, I simulate 1000 random matching cases for the whole population. In each
simulation, each j from group A is randomly assigned to an i from group B. 
3. i’s and j’s would decide match or not by comparing observed pizzazz and reservation
pizzazz. 
4 I use floor function since I am using integers to simulate here. 
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4. I use these simulated data to calculate the probability of matching for a given j at each
period, 𝑄(𝑗), and the expected utility flow of matching for j, 𝐸(𝑗). 
5. I calculate the continuation values for each j, 𝑐(𝑢?̅?), and set it as the new reservation
pizzazz, return to the step 2. 
We can observe that the two sets of reservation pizzazz rest in equilibrium. We can also see that 
the class structure of the symmetric case breaks. There still seems to be a “top class” in both 
groups, but there is no strict separation between classes. The situation favors agents in group A. 
There seems to be less volatility and they can obtain a higher standard. 
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It seems that it would take longer to match in the asymmetric case mostly for agents not in the 
first class. The first class is also consistent with the analytical result of the first class, where 𝑏 =
0.8, 𝑎 = 1.06. 𝑇𝑇𝐵 = 𝑢𝐵𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =
𝑎−𝑎𝑏+𝑏−√𝑎(1−𝑏)∗(𝑎−𝑎𝑏+2𝑏)
𝑏
= 0.4903. 𝑇𝑇𝐴 = 𝑢𝐴1̅̅ ̅̅̅ = 𝑎 ∗
1−√1−𝑏2
𝑏
=
0.53. 
4.3 Effect of Discounting Factor 
Let’s consider how the cost of delaying (discounting) would affect the whole marriage 
market’s equilibrium. I would approach this problem on the side of j to see how the change in b 
would affect the matching for a given individual j. 
 𝑢?̅? ≈  
𝐸(𝑗)
1/𝑏 − (1 − 𝑄(𝑗))
Since b is between 0 and 1, 1/𝑏 is larger than 1, so the denominator is always positive. 
As b decreases from 1 to 0, there are more discounting and the reservation pizzazz decreases for 
j. It also makes sense. If b decreases from 1 to 0, there are more discounts from one period to
another, people would try to match as quickly as possible to avoid discounting cost. In order to 
match quickly, they have to lower their standard (reservation pizzazz 𝑢?̅?). Also, it could be 
understood as the continuation value decreases when there are more discounting. b would only 
affect other factors through the change of ?̅?. 
I solve the model again with 𝑎 = 1.06. The result is consistent with the analysis: as b 
increases, it would take longer to match. To illustrate the effect, I include the matching features 
for group A. 
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5. Conclusion 
My project may help to explain the marriage market at a different angle. It could be used 
to answer some questions about the change of the equilibrium of the marriage market. As the 
discounting factor increases (there are less discounting in each period), the class effect would be 
more significant. It takes a longer time to match for larger b. Although the model with 
asymmetric groups destroys the class structure, a change in b still generates the similar result. 
Nowadays, people have more options other than marriage to gain utility. There is less 
penalty for delay of marriage. It could be the case that the delay of the first marriage was due to 
the decrease in cost of delay or in some countries, increase in the sex ratio. 
With the analysis of the simple case, it seems that the discounting factor is the cause of 
class effect in Burdett and Cole’s model. Bigger discounting (smaller b) would make the class 
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wider. As the penalty for waiting increases, people would tend to match quicker and there would 
be less class effect. If we include information error in the model, the simulation result shows that 
as the information error spread decreases, it actually makes most people match slower. 
In the book The Changing Transitions to Adulthood in Developing Countries: Selected 
Studies, Mensch et al (2005) writes explicitly that “with the exception of Becker’s work, we have 
few theories that explicitly address age at marriage.” The theory of information error and 
matching could provide some more understanding this area of timing. 
The most significant contribution of this paper would be the discussion of discounting 
factor and introduction of asymmetric matching groups in the marriage matching model. It 
provides more economic insight into the timing of first marriage. It can also be applied to study 
other types of matching. We can think stock market essentially are two-sided matching. Only 
when the buyer and seller both agree to trade, there would be a trade. This paper can also be used 
to examine the marriage matching in countries with extremely skewed sex ratio, such as China. 
Further researchers can change some strict assumptions, such as the pizzazz distribution, 
to see how the different pizzazz distribution would have different structures of matching. It can 
also be done to include the cost of matching into the model, while in this model, I implicitly 
assumed that it could be included in the pizzazz.  
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